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2Abstract
This paper analyzes the fundamental changes in market structures that may result from the
increasing use of information technology. First, an analytic framework is presented and its
usefulness is demonstrated in explaining several major historical changes in American business
structures.
Then, the framework is used to help explain how electronic markets and electronic hierarchies will
allow closer integration of adjacent steps in the value added chains of our economy. The most
surprising prediction is that information technology will lead to an overall shift toward
proportionately more coordination by markets rather than by internal decisions within firms.
Finally, several examples of companies where these changes are already occurring are used to
illustrate the likely paths by which new market structures will evolve and the ways in which
individual companies can take advantage of these changes.
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3Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies:
Effects of Information Technology on
Market Structures and Corporate Strategies
The innovations in information technologies of the past two decades have radically reduced the time
and cost of processing and communicating information. These reductions have in turn brought many
changes in the ways tasks are accomplished within firms. Data processing systems have transformed
the ways in which accounting data is gathered and processed, for example, and CAD/CAM has
transformed the ways in which complex machinery is designed. Underlying (and often obscured by)
these changes in how business tasks are performed may be more fundamental changes in how firms
and markets organize the flow of goods and services through their value-added chains. This paper
addresses that more basic issue of how advances in information technology are affecting firm and
market structures and discusses the options these changes present for corporate strategies.
In brief, our thesis is that new information technologies are allowing closer integration of adjacent
steps on the value-added chain through the development of electronic markets and electronic
hierarchies. (See Figure 1) While these mechanisms are making both markets and hierarchies more
efficient, we argue that they will lead to an overall shift toward proportionately more market
coordination. Some firms will be able to benefit directly from this shift by becoming "market makers"
for the new electronic markets. Other firms will be able to benefit from providing the
interconnections to create electronic hierarchies. All firms will be able to benefit from the wider
range of options provided by these markets and by the possibilities for closer coordination provided by
electronic hierarchies.
After presenting the analytic framework on which our argument is based, we illustrate its usefulness
in explaining several major historical changes in American market structures. Then the central part
of the paper uses the framework to predict the consequences that changing information technologies
should have for our current market structures. In many cases, we are able to identify early examples
of these changes that have already occurred for some companies. Finally, we summarize some of the
implications of these changes for corporate strategy.
In addition to the changes in information technology that we discuss here, there are, of course. other
important forces such as changes in stock prices, antitrust regulations, and interest rates) that might
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affect firm and market structures. The possible consequences of these other forces are outside the
scope of this paper.
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Definitions of markets and hierarchies
Economies have two basic mechanisms for coordinating the flow of materials or services through
adjacent steps in the value-added chain: markets and hierarchies (e.g., see Williamson, 1975; Coase,
1937). Markets coordinate the flow through supply and demand forces and external transactions
between different individuals and firms. Market forces determine the design, price, quantity, and
target delivery schedule for a given product that will serve as an input into another process. That is,
the buyer of the good or service compares many possible sources of it and chooses the one with the best
combination of these attributes.
Hierarchies, on the other hand, coordinate the flow of materials through adjacent steps by controlling
and directing it at a higher level in the managerial hierarchy, rather than by letting market
transactions coordinate it. Managerial decisions, not the interaction of market forces, determine
design, price (if relevant), quantity, and delivery schedules at which products from one step on the
value-added chain are procured for the next step. Thus the procurer does not select a supplier from a
group of potential suppliers; it simply works with a single pre-determined supplier. In many cases,
the hierarchy is simply a firm, while in others, the hierarchy may span two legally separate firms in a
close, sole supplier relationship.
Variants of the two pure relationships exist, but can usually be categorized as primarily one or the
other. When a single supplier serves one or more buyers as a sole source of some good, the
relationship between the supplier and each buyer is primarily hierarchical, since the buyers are each
procuring their supplies from a single, pre-determined supplier, rather than chosing from a number of
suppliers. If, on the other hand, a single buyer uses multiple suppliers serving only that buyer, the
relationship between that buyer and each supplier is governed by market forces, since the buyer is
chosing between a number of possible suppliers. As the number of suppliers is reduced towards one,
relationships may exist that have characteristics of both types.
Factors favoring markets or hierarchies
A number of theorists (e.g., Coase. 1937: and Williamson, 1975. 1979, 1981) have analyzed the
relative advantages of hierarchical and market methods of organizing economic activity in terms of
various kinds of coordination costs or transaction costs. These coordination costs take into account
5the costs of gathering information, negotiating contracts, and protecting against risks of
"opportunistic" bargaining. Building on this work, Malone and Smith (1984; Malone, 1985) have
summarized several of the fundamental tradeoffs between markets and hierarchies in terms of three
types of costs: production costs, coordination costs, and vulnerability costs. Table 1 summarizes the
part of their analysis that is most relevant to our argument here.l
Table 1
RELATIVE COSTS FOR MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES
Organizational form Production
costs
Markets
Hierarchies
L
H
Coordination
costs
H
L
Vulnerability
costs
L
H
In a pure market, with many buyers and sellers, the buyer can compare many different possible
suppliers of the product and select the one that provides the best combination of characteristics (such
as design and price), thus presumably minimizing production costs for the desired product. One of the
obvious benefits of this arrangement is that it allows the demands of numerous buyers to be pooled in
order to take advantage of economies of scale and load leveling. The coordination costs associated
with this wide latitude of choice, however, are relatively high, because the buyer must gather and
analyze information from a variety of possible suppliers. In some cases, these market coordination
costs must also include additional negotiating or risk-covering costs that arise from dealing with
"opportunistic" trading partners. Finally, since the selection of a given supplier at one time does not
preclude selecting a different supplier at a later time, the market presumably also minimizes the
buyer's vulnerability costs arising from changes in its requirements or disruptions in a supplier's
ability to fulfill them.
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6Hierarchies, on the other hand, restrict the procurer's choice of suppliers to the one supplier
hierarchically connected to the procurer, either within a single company or in a closely linked
relationship between two companies, thus leading, in general, to higher production costs than in the
market arrangement. This arrangement, however, reduces coordination costs over those incurred in
a market by eliminating the procurer's need to gather and analyze a great deal of information about
various suppliers. The hierarchical relationship also carries higher vulnerability costs than the
market in that the procurer cannot readily shift to another supplier, and vice versa. However, the
greater control afforded by the hierarchical arrangement may mitigate this high cost in some cases.
Various factors affect the relative importance of production, coordination, and vulnerability costs,
and thus the relative desirability of markets and hierarchies (e.g., see Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981).
In this paper, we will focus on those factors that are particularly susceptible to change by the new
information technologies. Clearly, at a very general level, one of these factors is coordination cost.
Since the essence of coordination involves communicating and processing information, the use of
information technology seems likely to decrease these costs (e.g., see Malone, 1985). Two other, more
specific, factors that can be changed by information technology are also important in determining
which coordination structures are desirable: asset specificity and complexity of product description.
The importance of asset specificity has been amply demonstrated by previous analyses (e.g.,
Williamson, 1981), but the importance of the complexity of product descriptions has not, we believe,
been satisfactorily analyzed before.
Asset specificity. An input used by a firm (or individual consumer) is highly asset specific, according
to Williamson's definition (1981), if it cannot readily be used by other firms because of site specificity,
physical asset specificity, or human asset specificity. A natural resource available at a certain
location and moveable only at great cost is site specific, for example. A specialized machine tool or
complex computer system designed for a single purpose is physically specific. Highly specialized
human skills, whether physical (e.g., a trade with very limited applicability) or mental (e.g., a
consultant's knowledge of a company's processes), that cannot readily be put to work for other
purposes are humanly specific. We propose yet another type of asset specificity to add to Williamson's
list: time specificity. 2 A perishable product that must arrive at its destination and be used (or sold)
within a very limited period of time from its production, for example, is time specific, as is any input
to a manufacturing process that must arrive at a very specific time in relation to the manufacturing
process or involve great costs or losses.
There are several reasons why a highly specific asset is more likely to be obtained through
hierarchical coordination than through market coordination (Williamson, 1979, 1981). Transactions
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7involving asset-specific products often involve a long process of development and adjustment for the
provider to meet the needs of the procurer, and this process favors the continuity of relationships
-found in a hierarchy. Moreover, since there are, by definition, few alternative procurers or suppliers
of a highly asset specific product in the market, both the procurer and the provider are at risk when
they depend on each other. If either one goes out of business or changes its need for (or production of)
the product, the other may suffer sizable losses. Thus, both participants are also potentially
vulnerable to each other's opportunistic bargaining strategies.
Complexity of product description. Complexity of product description refers to the amount of
information needed to specify the attributes of a product. Market transactions require a great deal of
communication about the product to gather information and negotiate contracts. High complexity of
product description increases the cost of such communication. Conversely, low complexity of product
description decreases the cost of such communication. Thus, other things being equal, assets with
highly complex descriptions are more likely to be transferred by transactions within hierarchies than
across markets. Uniformly graded commodities, on the other hand, are simply designated and thus
easily bought and sold in a large market.
At first glance, this factor seems to be related to asset specificity; that is, in many cases a highly
specific asset will require a more complex product description than a less specific asset. The two
factors are independent, however, in spite of this frequent correlation. For example, coal produced by
a coal mine located right next to a manufacturing plant is highly site specific, though the product
description is quite simple. Conversely, an automobile is low in asset specificity, but the description
of its attributes necessary to fully identify it is quite complex.
As Figure 2A shows, then, inputs to a production process that are both highly asset specific and
highly complex in product description are more likely to be obtained through a hierarchical
relationship, while inputs that are not very asset specific and are simple in product description are
likely to be obtained through a market relationship. Our framework does not predict the form of
relationship more likely for obtaining inputs in the other two cells of the table.
HISTORICAL CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURES
To illustrate the application of our analytic framework, we briefly examine the historical evolution of
market structures in America, paying piart icular attention to the effects of a key nineteenth century
information technology, the telegraph. (The analysis in this section draws on arguments by Chandler
I ·
8[19771, Williamson [1981], Malone & Smith [1983], Malone [1985], and Du Boff[1983]. Yates [1986]
develops this application in more detail.)
Up through the mid nineteenth century, small scale local and regional markets, not hierarchies,
coordinated adjacent stages in American industrial activity. In manufacturing, the three major
functions - procurement, production, and distribution - were generally handled by different parties.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the dramatic improvements in communication and
transportation provided by the telegraph and the railroads created a network for exchanging
information and goods over great distances, thus effectively increasing the area over which markets
or hierarchies might be established.
Our analytic framework helps explain how these developments encouraged first the expansion of
markets and then the development of hierarchies. The expansion of areas over which rapid
communication and transportation were possible allowed, for the first time, the development of large
scale national markets. Furthermore, the reduction in time and cost for communication favored
markets over hierarchies because (as Table 1 shows) decreases in communication costs benefit
communication-intensive markets more than they benefit hierarchies. These nationwide markets
are not equally desirable for all products, however. Just as our framework would lead us to expect,
nationwide markets mediated by telegraph developed in such areas as the stock market and
commodities futures. These products were non-specific assets (although commodities had been
relatively site specific until the railroad improved transportation) with many potential buyers. In
addition, they were easily describable, and consequently susceptible to standardization to reduce
communication costs further. The commodities futures market, for example, only emerged on a
national scale after a uniform grading scheme had been adopted (DuBoff, 1983).
The story did not end there, however, because the growth in market areas created by the telegraph
and railroad also provided the impetus for the emergence of large scale integrated firms. In general,
when the size of the economy increases, communication costs increase proportionately more for a
market than for a hierarchy (see Malone and Smith, 1984; Malone, 1985). Depending on the relative
importance of increases in the amount of communication necessary in larger markets versus any
decreases in the cost of that communication, hierarchies may become more attractive than markets.
In particular, when products are specific to certain kinds of customers or when they are difficult to
describe, the coordination of their production and distribution in a national market requires a great
deal of communication, thus often making a hierarchy more desirable than a market.
The detailed evolutionary path of large integrated hierarchies was more complex than that of
national markets, and it involved several factors other than the telegraph. Nevertheless, our
--- ~~~~~~~~~~---- r·3--- ;- --- .-·-- -·- ·-- ·  ;··-_-- ··· _111- _ -___------ -- -------
9framework again proves useful in the explanation of which conditions led to which forms. The growth
of market areas and thus the potential number of buyers, according to Chandler (1977), encouraged
producers to increase their production; They frequently did so by developing new techniques of mass
production that offered economies of scale. Such firms, however, frequently found that existing
procurement and distribution mechanisms did not support the high volume throughput necessary to
realize the economies, especially when procurement or distribution for the product required
specialized equipment or human expertise. As Williamson (1981) has pointed out, the companies that
Chandler identifies as the first to vertically integrate procurement, production, and distribution
within a hierarchy were those companies with asset specific products (such as meat packers with
perishable products requiring railroad refrigeration cars and rapid delivery, and manufacturers of
complex machine tools with specialized sales and support needs). For these firms, the telegraph
provided a mechanism by which close hierarchical coordination could be wielded over great distances.
While the economies of scale were the major factor driving this integration, asset specificity played a
role in determining which firms were likely to integrate, using the telegraph as a mechanism of
hierarchical coordination rather than as a mechanism of market communication.
Thus our analytic framework is useful in interpreting past changes in the balance between markets
and hierarchies, even when non-communication factors play a large role. In the next section, we
apply the framework to contemporary developments.
CONTEMPORARY CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURES
We can now give a fuller explanation of the nature of electronic hierarchies and markets, the
conditions under which each is likely to emerge, and the reasoning behind our thesis that the balance
is shifting towards electronic markets.
Emergence of electronic interconnection
Let us begin by looking briefly at the technological developments that make electronic integration of
either type possible and desirable. New information technologies have greatly reduced both the time
and cost of communicating information, just as the telegraph did when it was introduced. In
particular, higher bandwidth telecommunications may (1) allow more information to be
communicated in the same amount of time (or the same amount in less time), and (2) decrease the
costs of this communication dramatically. These effects of new information technology may be
termed the electronic communication effect, and they benefit both markets and hierarchies.
·---r.r - I Bli· -----. 
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In addition to these well-known general advantages of electronic communication, electronic
coordination can be used to take advantage of two other effects: the electronic brokerage effect, and
the electronic integration effect. The electronic brokerage effect is of benefit primarily in the case of
computer-based markets. A broker is an agent who is in contact with many potential buyers and
suppliers and who, by filtering these possibilities, helps match buyers and suppliers to each other.
The presence of the broker substantially reduces the need for buyers and suppliers to contact a large
number of alternative partners individually (see Baligh & Richartz [1967] and Malone [1985] for
detailed formal analyses of the benefits of brokering). The electronic brokerage effect simply means
that electronic markets, by electronically connecting many different buyers and suppliers through a
central data base, can fulfill this same function. The standards and protocols of the electronic market
allow a buyer to screen out obviously inappropriate suppliers, and to compare the offerings of many
different potential suppliers quickly, conveniently, and inexpensively. Thus the electronic brokerage
effect offered by an electronic market can (1) increase the number of alternatives that can be
considered, (2) increase the quality of the alternative eventually selected, and (3) decrease the cost of
the entire product selection process.
When a supplier and a procurer use information technology to create joint, interpenetrating processes
at the interface between value-added stages, they are taking advantage of the electronic integration
effect. The benefits of the electronic integration effect are usually captured most easily in electronic
hierarchies, but they are sometimes apparent in electronic markets, as well. One simple benefit of
this effect is the time saved and the errors avoided by the fact that data need only be entered once.
Much more important benefits of close integration of processes are possible in specific situations.
CAD/CAM technology, for example, often allows both design engineers and manufacturing engineers
to access and manipulate the design and manufacturing data to try out more potential designs and to
create a product more acceptable to both sides. As another example, systems linking the supplier's
and procurer's inventory management processes so that the supplier can ship the products "just in
time" for their use in the procurer's manufacturing process, enable the procurer to eliminate
inventory holding costs, thus reducing total inventory costs for the linked companies.
These advantages of electronic interconnections compared to existing non-electronic coordination
methods provide substantial benefits. The recipients of these benefits (either buyers, suppliers, or
both) should be willing to pay for them (either directly or indirectly), and thus the providers of
electronic markets and electronic hierarchies should, in many cases, be able to realize significant
revenues from providing these services.
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Factors favoring electronic markets or electronic hierarchies
The factors shown in Figure 2A that favor markets or hierarchies, in general, apply to electronic
markets and electronic hierarchies, as well. Products high in physical asset specificity often require a
long and involved development and sales process. In such cases, the electronic integration effect is
likely to offer advantages and lead to "electronic virtual integration" or "electronic hierarchies."
Similarly, processes high in time specificity (i.e., those for which precise timing of delivery offers
special advantages) can make use of the same effect. Moreover, products that are highly asset specific
tend to have fewer suppliers (both because the demand is, on average, less and because the risk to
suppliers is high), so the electronic brokerage effect, which involves comparing a number of
alternative suppliers is less likely to be important.
Complexity of product description also affects the suitability of electronic markets and hierarchies.
Products that are low in complexity of description are susceptible to the standardization of
terminology necessary to establishing an electronic market. Such standards help reduce
communication costs and make possible the manipulating of large amounts of information from many
suppliers that is essential to achieving the electronic brokerage effect. Products with more complex
descriptions are not as susceptible to standardization and thus are less likely to be obtained via
electronic markets.
Shift from hierarchies toward markets
Our prediction that information technology will be more widely used for coordinating economic
activities is not a surprising one, even though our analysis of the three effects involved (electronic
communication, brokerage, and integration effects) is new. In this section, we move to a more
surprising and significant prediction: that the overall effect of this technology will be to increase the
proportion of economic activity coordinated by markets.
While the effects of information technology just discussed clearly make both markets and hierarchies
more efficient, we see two arguments supporting an overall shift towards market coordination: the
first is a general argument based on the analysis summarized in Table 1; the second is a more specific
argument based on shifts in asset specifity and complexity of product descriptions.
General argument favoring shift towards markets
Our first argument for the overall shift from hierarchies to markets is a simple one, based primarily
on two components. The first component is the assumption that the widespread use of information
technology is likely to decrease the "unit costs" of coordination. By coordination, we mean the
·___1 _^11_1___
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information processing necessary to determine the design, price, quantity, delivery schedule, and
other similar factors for products transferred between adjacent steps on a value-added chain. In
markets, this involves selecting suppliers, negotiating contracts, paying bills, and so forth. In
hierarchies, this involves managerial decision-making, accounting, planning, and control processes.
Since, by definition, these coordination processes involve communicating and processing information
it seems quite plausible to assume that information technology, when used appropriately, can reduce
these costs. This is, of course, an empirically testable hypothesis, and there are already some
suggestive data that support it (e.g., Crawford, 1982; Strassman, 1985; Jonscher, 1983).
The second component of our argument is based on the tradeoffs summarized in Table 1. As we noted
above, and as Williamson (1981a) and numerous others have observed, markets have certain
production cost and other advantages over hierarchies as a means of coordinating economic activity.
The primary disadvantage of markets is the cost of conducting the market transactions themselves.
For a number of reasons (including the "opportunistic" ones emphasized by Williamson and the
purely "informational" ones emphasized by Malone and Smith [1984]), these coordination costs are
generally higher in markets than in hierarchies. An overall reduction in these coordination costs
would make this dimension less important and the other two dimensions more important, thus
favoring market coordination.
We find the simplicity of this argument quite compelling, but its obviousness appears not to have
been widely recognized. There is also another, less obvious, argument that leads to the same
conclusion. This second argument is based on shifts in our key factors for determining coordination
structures: asset specificity and complexity of product description.
Changes in factors favoring electronic markets versus electronic hierarchies
As Fig. 2B shows, some of the new, computer-based information technologies have affected both of our
key dimensions in such a way as to create an overall shift from markets to hierarchies. Data bases
and high bandwidth electronic communication can handle and communicate complex,
multidimensional product descriptions much more readily than traditional modes of communication
can. Thus the line between high and low complexity has in effect shifted upward so that some
products with descriptions previously classified as highly complex, such as airline reservations, may
now fall into the category of having descriptions that are low in complexity. The line should continue
to shift upward for some time as the capabilities of information technology continue to evolve.
The dimension of asset specificity has also changed in such a way as to slightly favor markets over
hierarchies. Flexible manufacturing technology allows rapid changeover of production lines from one
------ _1_1.1_1_--__~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~...._._.. ~ .. .. .. ·,
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product to another. Thus some physically asset-specific components that are similar to other, non-
specific components may begin to be produced by more companies. Companies that in the past would
not have tooled up for such a small market now may produce small numbers of these components
without significant switchover costs. Thus the vertical line in Fig. 2A moves slightly right in Fig. 2B,
because some asset-specific components have become, in essence, less specific.
Both these changes increase the region of the chart in which market modes of coordination are
favored, lending more support to our argument that there will be an overall shift in this direction.
Examples of shift toward electronic markets
A dramatic example of this process has already occurred in the airline industry. When airline
reservations are made by a customer calling the airline directly (and the "commission" received by
the airline's own sales department), the selling process is coordinated by the hierarchical relationship
between the sales department and the rest of the firm. When airline reservations are made through a
travel agent, the sale is made (and commission received) by the travel agent acting as an external
selling agent for the airline. The selling process, in this case, is coordinated by the market
relationship between the travel agent and the airline. Due, presumably in large part, to the greater
range of choices conveniently available through the electronic market, the proportion of total
bookings made by travel agents (rather than by customers dealing with airline sales departments)
has doubled from 35% to 70% since the introduction of the American Airlines reservations system
(Petre, 1985, pp. 43-44).
Similarly, there are many recent examples of companies such as IBM, Xerox, and General Electric
substantially increasing the proportion of components from other vendors contained in their products
(e.g., see Prokesh, 1985; Business Week, 1986). This kind of "vertical disintegration" of production
activities into different firms has become more advantageous as computerized inventory control
systems and other forms of electronic integration allow some of the advantages of the internal
hierarchical relationship to be retained in market relationships with external suppliers.
In the next section, we will trace out in more detail the motivations and probable evolutionary paths
for the development of electronic markets and electronic hierarchies as suggested by our framework.
In many cases, we are able to cite early examples of companies that have begun to traverse these
paths.
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EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC MARKETS
AND ELECTRONIC HIERARCHIES
Motives for establishing electronic markets: Possible market makers
As Figure 3 indicates, any of several participants in an emerging electronic market may be its
initiator or market maker, each with different motives. In any existing market, there are already a
number of participants. For a market to exist at all there must be both producers and buyers of some
good or service. (Depending on the nature of the good or service and on the coordination mechanism
used, "producers" may also be called "manufacturers" or "suppliers," and we use these three terms
interchangeably. Similarly, we use the terms "buyers," "procurers," and "consumers"
interchangeably.) In addition to these primary participants, an existing market may also include two
other kinds of participants. First, there may be various levels of "middlemen" who act as distributors,
brokers, or agents in the transfer of the goods being sold. We will usually use the term "distributors"
to refer to all these levels. Second, there may also be various kinds of financial service firms such as
banks and credit card issuers who store, transfer, and sometimes loan the funds involved in the
transactions. Finally, we may regard as potential participants in any electronic marketplace the
information technology vendors who can provide the networks, terminals, and other hardware and
software necessary for a computer-based market. Each of these different kinds of market participants
has different motivations and different possibilities for helping to form electronic markets.
Producers
As the initial maker of a product, the producing firm is motivated to have buyers purchase its
products rather than those of its competitors. This motivation has already led several producers to
establish electronic interconnections with their buyers. Although these electronic systems were
originally established to encourage travelers to buy tickets from the airline providing the service,
they now provide access to tickets from all airlines (Petre, 1985; Business Week, 1985c; Cash &
Konsynski, 1985). Another example of an electronic interconnection established by a producer is
American Hospital Supply's ASAP system. With this system, several thousand hospitals that buy
American Hospital's (AHS) products are provided with terminals on their own premises that allow
them to automatically enter orders for AHS products (Jackson, 1985; Petre, 1985). Since this system
has only one supplier (AHS), we would classify it as an electronic hierarchy rather than an electronic
market. As we will describe below, our framework suggests that, in spite of the original motivations
of the producers, there are often strong forces that cause electronic hierarchies to evolve toward
electronic markets that do not favor specific producers.
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Buyers
In contrast to the producer, who would like to minimize the number of alternatives considered by
buyers, the buyers themselves would like to maximize the number of alternatives considered and the
ease of comparing among them. One way of doing this is for buyers to begin using computer
databases containing information about alternative products. In some cases, the buyers are powerful
enough in a market that they can require suppliers to provide this information. For example,
General Motors already requires its primary suppliers to conform to the computer hardware and
communications standards established by the Automotive Industry Action Group (Cash &
Konsynski, 1985). These systems can then be used to speed order processing and implement
innovations such as "just-in-time" inventory management (Business Week, 1985a). Groups of buyers
are currently developing similar electronic markets in the grocery, chemical, and aluminum
industries as well (Business Week, 1985a). Unlike systems provided by producers, which are
motivated by the desire to establish an attractive distribution channel for certain products, these
systems are established by buyers to make supplier selection, order processing, and inventory
management more efficient.
Distributors
In some cases, the initiative for a computer-based market may come from distributors rather than
directly from buyers or suppliers. In the pharmaceuticals industry, for example, wholesale
distributors such as McKesson have followed the lead of producers such as American Hospital Supply
in setting up electronic connections with their customers (Business Week, 1985b). Like American
Hospital, such distributors established the electronic links in order to try to monopolize the business
of their customers, and at this stage, the systems are still electronic hierarchies rather than electronic
markets. Just as with systems developed by producers, however, we expect that electronic links
developed by distributors will often have an initial bias toward one or more producers, but that these
biases will usually disappear under pressure from competitive and legal forces. While the benefits to
the distributor may initially have had their source in the bias, the distributor may soon find that the
greater efficiency offered by the electronic market over conventional markets allows adequate
compensation to the distributor for running an unbiased market.
Financial services providers
By transferring the funds andior extending the credit required for transactions, banks and other
financial institutions are already involved as participants in most markets. In some cases, this
involvement can be the basis for providing a full-fledged electronic market. For example, some
_ 9_______·LPlp____----
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banks, such as Citicorp, provide to their credit card holders a telephone shopping service for a wide
variety of consumer goods (Stevenson, 1985). The system keeps a log of the lowest retail prices
available for all the products included. Cardholders can call for a price quotation, order the goods
over the phone using their credit card, and have the goods delivered to their door. In a similar spirit
Citicorp and McGraw-Hill have formed a joint venture to make information about alternative oil
prices for crude oil and to match buyers and sellers (Bennett, 1985). Similarly, Louie (1985) describes
the evolution of the PRONTO home banking system at Chemical Bank, NY, from offering a single
financial service (home banking) to becoming a full systems operator and providing home information
services with stock prices and home retailing information.
The initial motivation of the financial institution in these cases is presumably not to favor the sale of
any particular producer's products, but to increase the volume of transaction processing and credit-
based income for the financial institution.
Information technology vendors
In all of the above examples, the hardware, networks, and often software necessary to create
computer-based markets are provided by information technology vendors. Even though these
examples illustrate how the line between information technology vendors and other kinds of firms is
beginning to blur, there are still some cases where firms whose primary business is supplying
information technology may be able to make computer-based markets themselves. For example,
Western Union has a system for matching freight shippers with motor freight carriers and checking
that the carriers have the necessary legal authorization and insurance coverage (Ives and
Learmonth, 1984, p. 1199).
It is easy to imagine other examples of information technology vendors making markets. For
example a natural extension of the classified directory now provided by telephone companies would
be "electronic Yellow Pages," perhaps including capabilities for actually placing orders as well as
locating suppliers. (A directory-only service of this type is already offered by Automated Directory
Services [Koenig, 19831).
Stages in the Evolution of Electronic Markets
We saw above that electronic markets mav evolve from non-electronic markets or from electronic or
non-electronic hierarchies. Frequently that evolution involves an intermediate stage, a biased
market, but eventually proceeds to an unbialsed market. In the future, that evolution may continue to
a personalized market.
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From biased to unbiased markets
Some of the first providers of electronic markets have attempted to exploit the benefits of the
electronic communication effect in order to capture customers in a system biased towards a particular
supplier. We believe that, in the long run, the significant additional benefits to buyers possible from
the electronic brokerage effect will drive almost all electronic markets toward being unbiased
channels for products from many suppliers. For example both American Airlines and United Airlines
have introduced reservation systems that allow travel agents to find and book flights, print tickets,
and so forth (Petre, 1985; Business Week, 1985c; Cash & Konsynski, 1985). The United system
originally was established as an electronic hierarchy that allowed travel agents to book only flights
on United. To compete with this system, American established a system that included flights from all
airlines (thus making it a true market), but with American flights on a given route listed first. This
shift to a biased market was possible both because airline reservations are not asset-specific and
because they can be described in standardized forms and manipulated in standardized processes that
- may be quickly and easily handled by the new technology. United soon adoped the same strategy and
by 1983 travel agencies that used automated reservation systems used one of these two systems in
65% of the reservations they made (Cash & Konsynski, 1985, p. 139). The significant bias in favor of
their suppliers' flights that was introduced by these two systems eventually led other airlines to
protest, and recent rules from the CAB eliminated much of the bias in the system. Now the systems
continue to provide the same reservation service to other airlines for a significant fee.
A similar evolution may result in the case of American Hospital Supply's ASAP order entry system.
American Hospital is apparently trying to prevent that outcome by making the shared processes
themselves more asset specific. Jackson, 1985, p. 137 describes the many features built into the
ASAP system to customize the system to a particular hospital's needs, in effect creating a procedural
asset specificity in the relationship between buyer and seller. These features include purchase
history files, computation of economic order quantities, and basic order file templates. In each case
described, powerful one-to-one hierarchical relationships are established between buyer and seller.
However, most of the medical products sold through the system meet the criteria listed above for
electronic markets: they are not uniquely useful for specific customers, and their descriptions are
relatively simple and standardized. Therefore, our model leads us to predict that this system (or its
competitors) will move toward including products from many different suppliers. The same evolution
is likely in the case of pharmaceutical distributors such as McKesson.
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These examples illustrate what we suggest will be a very common case: Producers who start out by
providing a biased electronic market will eventually be driven by competitive or legal forces to
remove or significantly reduce the bias.
From unbiased to personalized markets
One of the potential problems with unbiased electronic markets of the sort we have described is that
they might overwhelm buyers with more alternatives than the buyers can possibly consider. This
problem will be less important in commodity-like markets where the product descriptions are well-
known standards and where the only dimension on which products are compared is price. But the
problem will be particularly acute in markets for which the product descriptions involve a number of
related attributes that are compared in different ways by different buyers. Retail sales of consumer
products, for example, would fall in this category.
For example, techniques from artificial intelligence used in filtering electronic messages of all kinds
(Malone, Grant, & Turbak, 1986) can be used to screen advertising messages and product descriptions
according to precisely the criteria that are important to a given buyer. Air travellers, for instance,
might specify rules with which their own "automated buyers' agents" could compare a wide range of
possible flights and select the one that best matches that particular traveller's preferences. The
preferences might include decision rules for trading off between factors such as cost, convenient
arrival and departure times, window seats vs. aisle seats, minimum number of stops, and so forth. A
fairly simple set of such rules could, in many cases, do a better job of matching particular travellers'
preferences than all but the most conscientious and knowledgeable human travel agents.
In addition to techniques from artifical intelligence for specifying complex qualitative reasoning
processes, there are also a number of normative mathematical models (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976),
and descriptive behavioral models (Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978; Russo & Dosher, 1983;
Johnson & Payne, 1985) that could help in designing such systems.
Clearly these techniques will be more useful for certain products (e.g., those that are easily described
and non-specific) and certain buyers (e.g., industrial buyers doing routine purchasing rather than
consumers buying on impulse). Ultimately, however, such personalized decision aids may be widely
useful in both industrial and consumer purchasing for screening large amounts of electronically
stored product information on behalf of particular buyers.
Another intriguing possibility is that some of the preference rules specified by buyers might be made
available to suppliers. There are clearly cases where protecting the privacy of buyers should preclude
-1. 1I - ~I,- ~Z -, I~I I--I- .. . -- - ,' - _ _ _ _ 1_  - _ _ _ _ - . _ " __ - -- - _ -- ---
19
making this information available. In other cases, however, making the preferences of large numbers
of buyers automatically available (perhaps anonymously) to suppliers, could dramatically improve
the efficiency of certain kinds of market research and the responsiveness of suppliers. Instead of
having to painstakingly infer consumer decision rules from surveys or experiments, for example,
suppliers might be able to simply observe the actual rules consumers had specified.
Motives for Establishing Electronic Hierarchies
While the previous sections present our reasons for expecting an overall shift toward electronic
markets, there are still many cases where asset specificity is high and product descriptions are
complex, and thus where electronic hierarchies will be desirable. In particular, as Figure 4 suggests,
electronic hierarchies will be established to improve product development or to improve product
distribution. In this section, we discuss why and how companies may establish electronic hierarchies
for each of these functions.
Product development. In product development, CAD/CAM, electronic mail, and other information
technologies can be used to enhance the hierarchical coordination between design and manufacturing
groups. The electronic integration effect can be used, in this case, to (1) shorten the development
cycle, (2) increase the number of alternative designs considered, (3) reduce development (i.e.,
coordination) costs, (4) reduce manufacturing costs (by involving manufacturing engineers in the
design process), and (5) produce a higher quality product. The President of Xerox's newly integrated
Engineering and Manufacturing Group, for example, says of such integration that "It is the key to
faster and less costly development, to lower manufacturing costs, and to better products" (Hicks,
1984).
The key data that must be shared in the product development process are engineering drawings,
parts descriptions, bills of materials, engineering change notices, machine tool configurations, and so
forth. For example, in many companies the engineering change notice process is considered a people-
intensive, time-consuming, and error-prone administrative activity. Because the shared data base of
an electronic hierarchy allows people directly involved in the change to work with the ECN process
electronically, the large bureaucracy previously needed for administering this process coordination
may be severely reduced.
Xerox's new electronic ECN process, for instance, involves three parties: the design engineer, who is
also responsible for the manufacturability of the change and the entering of the change in the spare
parts ordering process. the manufacturing engineer, who designs the actual manufacturing process
and the manufacturing analyst, who updates the necessary manufacturing data bases to
 _1 _I____yllll__ll__lll____1_1______1111_-_
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accommodate the change. In the previous process, a number of other people were also involved: the
advanced manufacturing engineer, who worked with the design engineer to determine general
manufacturability; the administrator of the record center where all data on the part was kept, who
managed copying and distribution to necessary parties; the manufacturing configuration specialist,
who provided information on the manufacturing bill of materials and maintained any changes
required; and the spare parts planner, who did the entering and ordering of spares for initializing the
product in the distribution system. The electronic data base permits significant reduction in
administrative coordination costs, and, more importantly, increases the quality and timeliness of the
product development process as well.
Although the example just described is of electronic integration within one organization, there have
also been examples of linkages between design and manufacturing groups in different companies in
both heavy manufacturing and the auto industry (Prokesh, 1985; Cash & Konsynski, 1985) In the
design of semiconductor circuits, for instance, over 100 different processes and over 30 to 40 separate
organizations have traditionally been involved (Strassmann, 1985; and Feigenbaum and McCorduck,
1984). Use of the Mead Conway method for VLSI design and electronic integration between
organizations has' dramatically reduced the number of processes and people involved. Designers in
remote organizations use standardized languages in functionally rich workstations, then send their
standardized design data bases over a network to a supplier fabrication facility where they are linked
to the supplier's manufacturing process data bases. The end result is that the test circuits are
delivered to the procurer at much lower cost and in much shorter time.
Thus electronic integration of product design and development, whether within or between firms,
uses linked or shared data bases to achieve more efficient and effective product development cycles.
The electronic integration effect may also be realized in product distribution.
Product distribution. In product distribution systems, there are two primary participants: the
procurer and the supplier. The procurer's goal for establishing electronic hierarchies may be to have
the inventory available to the factory production process "just-in-time," thus eliminating inventory
carrying costs as well as all production control necessary to manage staging of inventory (Nakane
and Hall, 1983). That is, to lower inventory costs, procurers may raise the time specificity of the
process. Firestone, for example, is part of the physical and electronic inventory system of two of the
major car manufacturers, with the result that it carries the inventory of tires, rather than the car
manufacturer. Similarly, the large battery manufacturer that supplies the tire manufacturer's retail
stores is tied into the store's physical and electronic inventory systems.
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As we saw above, these electronic interconnections are allowing many manufacturers to rely
increasingly on external suppliers of components rather than on manufacturing the components
themselves (e.g., Prokesh, 1985). One somewhat paradoxical aspect of this shift is that even though
manufacturers are increasing the volume of components purchased externally, they are decreasing
the number of suppliers from which these components are purchased (Prokesh, 1985, p. D5). This
paradox can be resolved, however, by noting that the reasons given for decreasing the number of
suppliers (e.g., to become preferred customers and thus increase leverage with the suppliers) amount
to ways of increasing the asset specificity of the products. In other words, these buyers are using
information technology to "get the best of both worlds"--they are making increasing use of electronic
markets, but their relationships with each of the suppliers in these markets are becoming
increasingly like electronic hierarchies.
The supplier may be motivated to enter such a just-in-time arrangement for defensive reasons--doing
so may be a condition of doing business with the procurer. The supplier, however, may also perceive
other advantages in an electronic arrangement. Jackson (1985, p. 134) asserts that a buyer is
unlikely to tamper with an established just-in-time relationship: "because changing would require
another substantial investment in learning to work with the new vendor." That is, the shared data
bases and shared physical and electronic processes may become physically and humanly specific, as
well as time specific, increasing the likelihood of a-hierarchical rather than market relationship. As
we saw above, this is clearly a consideration in early systems such as that developed by American
Hospital Supply. As we saw earlier, however, such electronic hierarchies frequently develop into
biased, then unbiased electronic markets when the products themselves are not asset specific and are
easy to describe in standardized terms.
In addition to these separate motives, both the procurer and the supplier may be motivated to reduce
the time, cost, and errors produced by an extensive procurement system that requires repeated
entries, transmissions, translations into different terms, and re-entries of information between paper
and computer systems of suppliers and procurers. For the auto makers and component suppliers, for
example, this costly process results in errors in approximately 5% of all procurer/supplier documents,
according to an industry group. (Business Week, 1985a). This group, the Automotive Industry Action
Group, is establishing standard forms and processes for the four big auto companies and their many
suppliers to use. Once these standards are established, the existing electronic hierarchies between
buyers and sellers in this market are likely to evolve into electronic markets.
_ I I II
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Relative power of participants
As these examples illustrate, one of the critical factors involved in the establishment of electronic
interconnections is the relative power of the participants. The interconnections that emerge are
determined, in part, by the pre-existing power relationships of the participants, and these power
relationships may, in turn, be changed by the new electronic arrangements. For example, suppliers
may enter into a just-in-time inventory arrangement in order to continue doing business with a
powerful buyer, and the knowledge this arrangement gives the buyer about the inventory positions of
all its suppliers may enhance the buyer's power even more.
Sometimes, merely agreeing on the standards for electronic systems can be the battleground on which
many of the power issues arise. For example, in the insurance industry, both the independent agents
and the major commercial and property carriers are hotly contesting the control of standards
(Benjamin, 1983). The large carriers would like to tie independent agents to their own systems and
see their proprietary standards as a means to achieve this. However, the independent agents,
through an industry association, are defining a set of standards for the primary insurance
transactions that will give them the freedom to do business with multiple carriers. A number of large
carriers have indicated that they will now live with the more general standards.
Stages in the evolution of electronic hierarchies
As we have seen above, shared data bases, made possible by advances in information technology, are
at the core of electronic hierarchies. They provide the mechanism for integrating processes across
organizational boundaries by allowing continuous sharing of information in easily accessible on-line
form (Benjamin and Scott-Morton, 1986).
Our primary basis for predicting the evolutionary path of these mechanisms is the observation that
both the benefits and the costs of electronic integration become greater as the coupling between
adjacent steps on the value-added chain becomes tighter. Thus we would expect organizations to
obtain limited benefits at low cost before moving to greater benefits at higher cost. Figure 4 indicates
a plausible trajectory that this observation suggests: stand-alone but mutally accessible data bases
should appear first, then be replaced by electronically linked data bases and, eventually, by fully
shared data bases. We are not aware of good examples of all three stages of this trajectory occuring in
a single system, but we can describe examples of systems at each of the three stages.
Stand-alone data bases. In this stage, one or both parties makes their data bases accessible to the
other party in the electronic hierarchy. This often requires the other party to use a separate
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workstation. For example, the early versions of the American Hospital Supply order entry system
required customers to use a separate workstation to access the AHS order entry programs and
purchasing history databases (Harvard Business School, 1985). Even though the database that is
built up in this process is, in some sense, "shared" by the customers and AHS, it is not connected to
the customers' accounting and other application systems, so we classify it as a stand-alone data base.
Linked data bases. In this stage, the data bases are still separate, but a formal on-line mechanism
passes information from one party's data base to the other. The most recent version of the AHS order
entry system (see Harvard Business School, 1985) allows this kind of direct computer-to-computer
communication. Orders are prepared by the customer's internal computer system, transmitted
electronically to AHS, and then order confirmations are returned to the customer's computer and
used to update the hospital's files. Another example of this level of linking is provided by the Mead-
Conway VLSI design methodology. Here, electronic networks are used to transfer product design
specifications from the CAD system on the designer's workstation to a manufacturing system that is
located at a remote site and owned by another organization.
Shared data bases. In this final stage, one data base contains information of value for both parties in
the electronic hierarchy. The Engineering Change Notice process we described above illustrates a
simple example of this situation and great effort is currently being expended by CAD/CAM vendors
and manufacturing companies to implement and use the integrated engineering/manufacturing data
base environment successfully (e.g., Meyers, 1982).
CONCLUSIONS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
A casual reading of the business press makes clear that electronic connections within and between
organizations are becoming increasingly important (e.g., Petre, 1985; Business Week, 1985c; Cash &
Konsynski, 1985). The framework we have developed in this paper helps understand many of these
changes. We have shown how the increasing use of electronic interconnections can be seen as the
result of three forces: the electronic communication effect, the electronic brokerage effect, and the
electronic integration effect. We have analyzed how factors such as the ease of product description
and the degree to which products are specific to particular customers affect whether these
interconnections will take the form of electronic hierarchies or electronic markets. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, we have argued that, by reducing the costs of coordination, information
technology will lead to an overall shift toward proportionately more use of markets rather than
hierarchies to coordinate economic activity. By applying this framework, it is possible to see how
_
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many of the changes occuring today fit into a larger picture and to predict some of the specific
evolutionary changes that are likely to occur as information technology becomes more widely used.
Our analysis has several implications for corporate strategy:
(1) All market participants should consider whether it would be advantageous for them to try to
provide an electronic market in their marketplace. For some participants, providing such a market
may increase the sales of their current products or services. For all participants, it provides a
potential source of new revenues from the market-making activity itself.
(2) All organizations should consider whether it would be advantageous for them to coordinate some
of their own internal operations more closely or to establish tighter connections with their customers
or suppliers using electronic hierarchies.
(3) Market forces make it very likely that biased electronic sales channels (whether electronic
hierarchies or biased electronic markets) for non-specific, easily described, products will eventually
be replaced by unbiased markets. Therefore, the early developers of biased electronic sales channels
for these kinds of products should not expect that the competitive advantages these systems provide
will continue indefinitely. They should instead be planning how to manage the transition to
unbiased markets in such a way that they can continue to derive revenues from the market-making
activity itself.
(4) All firms should consider whether more of the activities they currently perform internally could
be performed less expensively or more flexibly by outside suppliers whose selection and work could be
coordinated by computer based systems.
(5) Advanced developers of computer-based marketing technology should begin thinking about how
to develop intelligent aids to help buyers select products from a large number of alternatives. Such
intelligent aids may eventually be able to act, in part, as automated agents for the buyers. They may
also, in some situations, be able to provide detailed information to suppliers about their customers'
preferences.
Ill
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Footnotes
1 This table compares the performance that is achievable with separate divisions in a product
hierarchy to the performance that is achievable with separate companies coordinated by a
decentralized market (see Malone, 1985, Table 2). As Malone (1985, pp. 18-19) notes, this comparison
is equivalent to a comparison between coordination by separate hierarchical firms and coordination
by a market.
2 Time specificity, as well as site specificity, could be viewed as special types of physical asset
specificity.
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Figure 1
ELECTRONIC INTEGRATION
Information Technology can be used to integrate adjacent steps on a
value-added chain through two mechanisms: more efficient electronic
markets and more tightly coupled electronic hierarchies
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Forms of Organization favored by Products with different characteristics
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-Impact of Information Technology on Forms of Organization
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EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC MARKET MAKERS
Multiple starting points lead to a common evolutionary path
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EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC HIERARCHIES
From separate to shared data bases
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